ORF 522: Lecture 8

Linear Programming: Chapter 11 Game Theory

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Rock-Paper-Scissors

A two person game.

Rules: At the count of three declare one of:

Rock Paper Scissors

Winner Selection. Identical selection is a draw. Otherwise:

- Rock beats Scissors
- Paper beats Rock
- Scissors beats Paper

Check out Sam Kass' version: Rock, Paper, Scissors, Lizard, Spock

It was featured recently on The Big Bang Theory.

Payoff Matrix

Payoffs are *from* row player *to* column player:

$$A = \begin{array}{ccc} R & P & S \\ P & \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \\ S & \begin{bmatrix} -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Note: Any *deterministic* strategy employed by either player can be defeated systematically by the other player.

Two-Person Zero-Sum Games

Given: $m \times n$ matrix A.

- Row player (rowboy) selects a strategy $i \in \{1, ..., m\}$.
- Col player (colgirl) selects a strategy $j \in \{1, ..., n\}$.
- Rowboy pays colgirl a_{ij} dollars.

Note: The rows of A represent deterministic strategies for rowboy, while columns of A represent deterministic strategies for colgirl.

Deterministic strategies are usually bad.

Randomized Strategies.

- Suppose rowboy picks i with probability y_i .
- Suppose colgirl picks j with probability x_j .

Throughout, $x = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 & x_2 & \cdots & x_n \end{bmatrix}^T$ and $y = \begin{bmatrix} y_1 & y_2 & \cdots & y_m \end{bmatrix}^T$ will denote *stochastic vectors*:

$$x_j \geq 0, \qquad j = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

 $\sum_j x_j = 1.$

If rowboy uses random strategy y and colgirl uses x, then *expected payoff* from rowboy to colgirl is

$$\sum_{i} \sum_{j} y_{i} a_{ij} x_{j} = y^{T} A x$$

Colgirl's Analysis

Suppose colgirl were to adopt strategy x.

Then, rowboy's best defense is to use y that minimizes the expected payment:

$\min_{y} y^{T} A x$

And so colgirl should choose that x which maximizes these possibilities:

$$\max_{x} \min_{y} y^{T} A x$$

Solving Max-Min Problems as LPs

Inner optimization is easy:

$$\min_{y} y^{T} A x = \min_{i} e_{i}^{T} A x$$

(e_i denotes the vector that's all zeros except for a one in the *i*-th position—that is, deterministic strategy *i*).

Note: Reduced a minimization over a *continuum* to one over a *finite set*.

We have:

$$\max (\min_{i} e_{i}^{T}Ax)$$

$$\sum_{j} x_{j} = 1,$$

$$x_{j} \ge 0, \qquad j = 1, 2, \dots, n.$$

m

Reduction to a Linear Programming Problem

Introduce a scalar variable v representing the value of the inner minimization:

 $\max v$

$$v \leq e_i^T A x, \qquad i = 1, 2, \dots, m,$$

$$\sum_j x_j = 1,$$

$$x_j \geq 0, \qquad j = 1, 2, \dots, n.$$

Writing in pure matrix-vector notation:

$$\max v$$

$$ve - Ax \leq 0$$

$$e^{T}x = 1$$

$$x \geq 0$$

(e denotes the vector of all ones).

Finally, in Block Matrix Form

$$\max \begin{bmatrix} 0\\1 \end{bmatrix}^T \begin{bmatrix} x\\v \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\begin{bmatrix} -A & e\\e^T & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x\\v \end{bmatrix} \stackrel{\leq}{=} \begin{bmatrix} 0\\1 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$x \ge 0$$
$$v \text{ free}$$

Rowboy's Perspective

Similarly, rowboy seeks y^* attaining:

 $\min_{y} \max_{x} y^{T} A x$

which is equivalent to:

$$\min u$$
$$ue - A^T y \ge 0$$
$$e^T y = 1$$
$$y \ge 0$$

Rowboy's Problem in Block-Matrix Form

$$\min \begin{bmatrix} 0\\1 \end{bmatrix}^T \begin{bmatrix} y\\u \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\begin{bmatrix} -A^T & e\\e^T & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y\\u \end{bmatrix} \stackrel{\geq}{=} \begin{bmatrix} 0\\1 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$y \ge 0$$
$$u \text{ free}$$

Note: Rowboy's problem is dual to colgirl's.

MiniMax Theorem

Let x^* denote colgirl's solution to her max-min problem. Let y^* denote rowboy's solution to his min-max problem. Then

$$\max_{x} y^{*T}Ax = \min_{y} y^{T}Ax^{*}.$$

Proof. From Strong Duality Theorem, we have

$$u^* = v^*$$

Also,

$$v^* = \min_{i} e_i^T A x^* = \min_{y} y^T A x^*$$
$$u^* = \max_{j} y^{*T} A e_j = \max_{x} y^{*T} A x$$

QED

"As far as I can see, there could be no theory of games...without that theorem...I thought there was nothing worth publishing until the Minimax Theorem was proved" – John von Neumann

AMPL Model

```
set ROWS;
set COLS;
param A {ROWS,COLS} default 0;
var x{COLS} >= 0;
var v;
maximize zot: v;
subject to ineqs {i in ROWS}:
    sum{j in COLS} -A[i,j] * x[j] + v <= 0;</pre>
subject to equal:
    sum{j in COLS} x[j] = 1;
```

AMPL Data

```
data;
set ROWS := P S R;
set COLS := P S R;
param A: P S R:=
        P 0 1 -2
        S -3 0 4
        R 5 -6 0
    ;
solve;
printf {j in COLS}: " %3s %10.7f \n", j, 102*x[j];
printf {i in ROWS}: " %3s %10.7f \n", i, 102*x[j];
printf {i in ROWS}: " %3s %10.7f \n", i, 102*ineqs[i];
```

AMPL Output

ampl gamethy.mod LOQO: optimal solution (12 iterations) primal objective -0.1568627451 dual objective -0.1568627451 P 40.0000000 S 36.0000000 R 26.0000000 P 62.0000000 S 27.0000000 R 13.0000000

Value = -16.0000000

Dual of Problems in General Form

Consider:

$$\max c^T x$$
$$Ax = b$$
$$x \ge 0$$

Rewrite equality constraints as pairs of inequalities:

$$\max c^T x$$

$$Ax \leq b$$

$$-Ax \leq -b$$

$$x \geq 0$$

Put into block-matrix form:

$$\max_{\substack{A \\ -A}} c^T x \leq \begin{bmatrix} b \\ -b \end{bmatrix}$$

$$x \geq 0$$

Dual is:

$$\min \begin{bmatrix} b \\ -b \end{bmatrix}^T \begin{bmatrix} y^+ \\ y^- \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\begin{bmatrix} A^T & -A^T \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y^+ \\ y^- \end{bmatrix} \ge c$$
$$y^+, y^- \ge 0$$

Which is equivalent to:

$$\begin{array}{rl} \min b^{T}(y^{+}-y^{-}) \\ A^{T}(y^{+}-y^{-}) & \geq & c \\ & y^{+},y^{-} & \geq & 0 \end{array}$$

Finally, letting $y = y^+ - y^-$, we get $\min b^T y$ $A^T y \ge c$ $y \qquad \text{free.}$

Moral


- Equality constraints \implies free variables in dual.
- Inequality constraints \implies nonnegative variables in dual.

Corollary:

- Free variables \implies equality constraints in dual.
- Nonnegative variables \implies inequality constraints in dual.

A Real-World Example The Ultra-Conservative Investor





We can let let $R_{j,t} = S_j(t)/S_j(t-1)$ and view R as a payoff matrix in a game between *Fate* and the *Investor*.

Fate's Conspiracy

The columns represent pure strategies for our conservative investor.

The rows represent how history might repeat itself.

Of course, for tomorrow, Fate won't just repeat a previous year but, rather, will present some mixture of these previous years.

Likewise, the investor won't put all of her money into one asset. Instead she will put a certain fraction into each.

Using this data in the game-theory ${\rm AMPL}$ model, we get the following mixed-strategy percentages for Fate and for the investor.

Investor's Optimal Asset Mix:			
XLP	90.7		
QQQQ	9.3		

Mean, old Fate's Mix: 2008-10-08 37.6 2008-11-28 62.4

The value of the game is the investor's expected return, 94.3%, which is actually a loss of 5.7%.

AMPL Model

```
set ROWS;
set COLS;
param A {ROWS,COLS} default 0;
var x{COLS} >= 0;
var v;
maximize zot: v;
subject to ineqs {i in ROWS}: sum{j in COLS} -A[i,j] * x[j] + v <= 0;</pre>
subject to equal: sum{j in COLS} x[j] = 1;
data;
set COLS := xlu xlb xli xlv xlf xle mdy xlk xly xlp qqqq spy;
set ROWS := include 'dates.out';
param A: xlu xlb xli xlv xlf xle mdy xlk xly xlp qqqq spy:=
include 'amplreturn3.data';
solve;
printf "Investor's strategy\n";
printf {j in COLS: x[j]>0.0005}: " %40s %5.1f \n", j, 100*x[j];
printf "\n";
printf "God's strategy\n";
printf {i in ROWS: ineqs[i]>0.0005}: " %40s %5.1f \n", i, 100*ineqs[i];
```